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Pablo T. Spiller t and Carlo Cardillitt
The United States' traditional command-and-control administration
of spectrum distorts technological change, prevents value maximization of
spectrum, and delays consumer access to new technologies. Extensive
technological change and increased demand for wireless communications
have exposed the economic inefficiencies and welfare losses generated by
the traditional spectrum administration, and have forced spectrum
regulators to begin a gradual deregulation of spectrum licensing. These
deregulatory steps have been hesitant and limited To properly prepare the
telecommunications sector for current and future technological
development, the US. should implement a property rights approach to
spectrum. A property rights approach would ameliorate the economic
inefficiencies of traditional spectrum regulation by allowing spectrum
holders to decide the appropriate use for the spectrum and to transfer the
spectrum to other users. Moreover, license holders could protect their
spectrum from interference in common-law courts through tort law. Recent
experiments in New Zealand and Guatemala reveal that spectrum property
rights, when implemented through careful legislation and a sophisticated
auction -process, are an immediately viable option for spectrum
management
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Introduction
These days, E.T. would be trying to phone home with a cellular
phone-not because it is fashionable, but because of sheer probability.
Around the world, whether in developed or developing nations, more
wireless phones are added per year than wireline phones.' Coupled with
increased demand for other wireless communications solutions, this trend
has resulted in a revolutionary increase in the demand for overall spectrum
usage. This demand requires technological, as well as regulatory,
solutions.
Recent technological innovations have increased the efficiency of
spectrum bands currently in use and allowed these bands to be switched
from low-value uses (e.g., outside broadcast relays) to high-value uses
(e.g., wireless local access). 2 Equipment that previously was limited to a
particular band can now be utilized relatively efficiently in various bands.
However, regulatory change predictably has lagged behind these
technological and demand changes. The traditional method of awarding a
license to operate a given service in a given band has become a barrier to
innovation, since new technology allows the utilization of that band for an
alternative, and probably more lucrative, .use. Thus, increased
I See DONALDSON, LUFKIN & JENRETTE, WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 49-50
(Spring 1998).
2 See Howard Shelanski & Peter Huber, Administrative Creation of Property Rights to
Radio Spectrum, 41 J.L. & ECON. 25 (forthcoming 1999) (working copy on file with author)
(observing that the technology now exists to provide "multiple uses of a single medium," thus
permitting shifts from low-value to high-value uses).
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technological flexibility has exposed the ossified structure of spectrum
regulation and requires regulatory changes to prevent ever-increasing
welfare losses.
The increased demand for spectrum has increased its political value,
enhancing the incentives of regulators to maintain the command-and-
control system in order to use spectrum to maximize political support.
Accordingly, regulators have attempted to handle the technological
revolution through administrative means, reallocating license holders onto
alternative bands and auctioning cellular, personal communications
systems (PCS), direct broadcast satellite (DBS), multipoint distribution
systems (MDS) and other licenses, while simultaneously protecting
incumbents, especially broadcasters.3 By forcing new technologies into the
existing administrative system for spectrum allocation, regulators have
generated large rents for incumbents (both wireless and wireline
operators),4 while competition in the global telecommunications market
has been restrained.
The purpose of this article is fourfold. First, we review the
administrative command-and-control system used historically to allocate
spectrum, analyze its associated inefficiencies, and explore administrators'
interests in perpetuating this system. Second, we provide what we believe
are the blueprints for a property rights approach to the allocation of
spectrum. Third, we analyze the experiences of New Zealand and
Guatemala in implementing spectrum property rights systems. Fourth, we
outline ways that the United States might accelerate the transition to a full
property rights system, utilizing lessons from both home and abroad.
I. Administrative Spectrum Allocation
A. Historical Evolution
Presenting a detailed account of the evolution of U.S. spectrum
administration is beyond the scope of this paper, and would merely
duplicate excellent existing treatises.5 Instead, we present a brief summary
of the three stages of U.S. administration of the spectrum: homesteading,
command-and-control, and creeping deregulation.
3 See infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
4 See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
5 See. e.g., MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL BROADBAND LAW (1996) [hereinafter
KELLOGG ET AL., BROADBAND LAW]; MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW (1992 & Supp. 1995) [hereinafter KELLOGG ET AL,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW]; see also Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the
Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133, 135-65 (1990) (discussing early U.S. spectrum
development and the creation of the U.S. command-and-control regulatory structure).
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1. Homesteading
The period from 1912 to 1927 is sometimes referred to as the
homesteading period.6 The Radio Act of 1912 reserved certain bands
exclusively for military or maritime usage yet left vast portions of the
electromagnetic spectrum free to the first occupant. A homesteader would
simply apply for a license from the Department of Commerce, whose
authority was limited to choosing a frequency that would minimize
interference! Despite these statutory limitations, then-Secretary of
Commerce Herbert Hoover attempted to ration frequency allocations,9
leading to the Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co. decision, in which the D.C.
Court of Appeals held that the Secretary of Commerce lacked the
discretion to deny frequency licenses.1 ° Hoover's continued attempts to
ration frequency led to the US. v. Zenith Radio Corp.l" decision in early
1926,2 in which a federal court in Illinois ruled that the Department of
Commerce had no power to regulate broadcast frequency or power."
As broadcasters multiplied in the aftermath of Zenith, it became
apparent that some mechanism was necessary to mitigate the growing
interference problems. One possible solution was the development of
spectrum property rights, and in 1926 a state court in Illinois set forth the
basic outline of spectrum property rights in the Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves
Broadcasting Station decision.14 Applying common law principles, the
Illinois court held that a new broadcaster was wrongfully trespassing on
the assigned frequency of an incumbent radio station.' 5 The Tribune
decision was a common-sense, common law response to the massive
proliferation of radio stations spurred by the holding in Zenith, and "had
the courts been given a chance ...this simple idea would have created
property rights in the stratosphere, much as the common law had
developed comparable principles 40,000 feet lower-rules of easement,
trespass and so on.'
' 6
6 See KELLOGG ET AL., BROADBAND LAW, supra note 5, § 4.6.1, at 236.
7 Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, §§ 1-5, 37 Stat. 302, repealed by Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169,
44 Stat. 1162. See also Hazlett, supra note 5, at 135 (stating that "the Secretary [of Commerce] took no
payment and issued no exclusive frequency rights .. .[leaving] many radio stations [to] roam[] the
spectrum at will").
8 See Radio Act of 1912 § 2; see also Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003, 1007
(D.C. Cir. 1923).
9 See Hazlett, supra note 5, at 139.
10 See Intercity Radio, 286 F. at 1006-07.
11 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. I11. 1926).
12 See Hazlett, supra note 5, at 141.
13 See Zenith, 12 F.2d at 617.
14 Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broad. Station (111. Cir. Ct. 1926), reprinted in 68 CONG.
REC. 215-19 (1926).
15 See id.
16 KELLOGG ET AL., BROADBAND LAW, supra note 5, § 4.6.1, at 238.
Vol. 16:53, 1999
A Property Rights Approach to Spectrum
2. Command-and-Control
Secretary Hoover staunchly opposed the homesteading approach,
favoring instead the creation of a command-and-control administrative
system. 7 With the support of President Calvin Coolidge, Hoover's
lobbying efforts resulted in the enactment of the Radio Act of 1927. I8 The
Act created a regulatory agency, the precursor of today's Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), 19 to administer spectrum allocation
according to "public convenience, interest or necessity. ' 20 Regulation of
the airwaves was further entrenched by the Supreme Court's 1943 decision
in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,21 in which the Court
affirmed the regulatory authority of the FCC to preserve the public interest
against injurious competition among broadcasters on the grounds that
broadcast spectrum is a physically scarce medium.2
Over time, the command-and-control system increased in complexity,
adopting a distinct regulatory approach, including different licensing
procedures, for almost every application of the spectrum. 23 The different
application processes, however, followed a similar pattern. Parties
interested in a portion of spectrum would petition the FCC for an
allocation.24 After numerous rounds of public comments, the FCC would
consent to an allocation and announce a timeline for license applications.25
Each applicant would also submit voluminous studies extolling the public
interest benefits of her application.26 After much deliberation, the FCC
would issue operating licenses specifying the location for the approved
17 See Hearings on H.R. 7357 Before the Comm. on Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 68th
Cong. 10 (1924) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 7357] (statement of Hon. Herbert Hoover, Secretary,
Department of Commerce).
18 Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
47 U.S.C.). For a discussion of the role of the lobbying efforts of President Coolidge and Secretary
Hoover in the passage of the Radio Act of 1927, see SYDNEY W. HEAD, BROADCASTING IN AMERICA
158-59 (6th ed. 1990).
19 See Radio Act of 1927 § 3.
20 Id. § 9; see also Hearings on H.R. 7357, at 8 (stating that "more authority must be
exerted in the interest of every user").
21 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
22 Id. at 213, 216-17. The physical scarcity rationale was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court,
despite substantial technological change, in 1969, see Red Lion Broadcast. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
375-77 (1969), and later in 1984, see FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 (1984).
Other courts have since found the scarcity logic less compelling. See, e.g., Telecommunications
Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("Since scarcity is a universal
fact, it can hardly explain regulation in one context and not another.").
23 For example, the process required to obtain a television license is different from the
process to obtain a cellular license. See HEAD, supra note 18, at 397-98.
24 See id.
25 See id.
26 See Michael E. Katz, Interview With an Umpire, in 1996 ANNUAL REVIEW: THE
EMERGING WORLD OF WIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS 5 (Institute for Information Studies ed.,
1996) [hereinafter EMERGING WORLD].
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transmitter, the type of technology to be used, the requisite operational
parameters, and the use to which the spectrum was to be put.
27
Although the FCC developed new licensing procedures as technology
developed, the command-and-control system for spectrum administration
remained in place, largely unchanged, until the 1980s.
3. Creeping Deregulation
The introduction of cellular services in the United States resulted in a
flood of applications that slowed the FCC's administrative process from a
mere crawl to a grinding halt,28 thereby exposing the inefficiencies built in
to the existing spectrum administration. Ultimately, the demand for
cellular communications unleashed the forces that have led to the reform
and partial deregulation of the licensing process for cellular and wireless
services.
Although the cellular concept originated at Bell Laboratories in
1947,29 the FCC did not initiate a frequency allocation process for cellular
service until 1974.' 0 After the success of experimental licenses in
Washington, D.C. and Chicago, the FCC decided in 1981 to license
cellular service on a nationwide commercial basis.3 Growth proceeded
slowly due to the regulatory maze at the FCC, 2 which held comparative
hearings to determine who among the many applicants would best serve
the public interest, convenience, and necessity.33 After awarding licenses
in the thirty largest markets (with two licenses per market), the FCC
realized that issuance of licenses for the remaining 704 markets would
have dragged on for years. Consequently, in November, 1982, the FCC
decided to issue cellular licenses by lottery-a radical departure from the
public-interest hearing approach.34
As demand for all forms of wireless communications increased by the
late 1980s,35 the FCC could no longer deny that the inefficiencies of the
27 See HEAD, supra note 18, at 366.
28 For a detailed and entertaining account of the introduction of wireless services, see
generally Lewis J. Paper, Getting Personal: The Politics of the Wireless Revolution, in EMERGING
WORLD, supra note 26.
29 See RAJAN KURUPPILLAI ET AL., WIRELESS PCS 5 (1997).
30 See In re An Inquiry Relative to the Future Use of the Frequency Band 806-960 MHz, 46
F.C.C.2d 752 (1974).
31 See In re An Inquiry into the Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz and 870-890 MHz for
Cellular Communications Systems, 86 F.C.C.2d 469 (1981).
32 See Paper, supra note 28, at 23.
33 In Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945), the Supreme Court held that if
two bona fide license applications are mutually exclusive, the applicants are entitled to a comparative
hearing.
34 See In re An Inquiry into the Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz and 870-890 MHz for
Cellular Communications Systems, 90 F.C.C.2d 571 (1982).
35 See Lawrence J. Moushin, Current Developments in Wireless Communications, in
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND REGULATION 1990, at 53, 54-55 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
58
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administrative system were reducing consumer welfare. Not only had the
FCC resorted to frequency assignments by lottery,36 but its own internal
analysis revealed that restricting the use to which one could put a
particular frequency band generated large social costs. 37 In response to
these inefficiencies, the FCC initiated various deregulatory reforms,
although it limited this increased freedom to carefully controlled dollops.
One such reform was the grant to licensees of a little more freedom in
deciding how to use their licenses. Another such reform was adopted
pursuant to Congress's 1993 decision to grant the FCC authority to auction
licenses in the 1.9 gigahertz (GHz) band for PCS. 3' Following this
determination, the FCC decided in 1996 to allow PCS licensees to
disaggregate spectrum by geography and frequency, 39 and to allow the
winners of a soon-to-be-held auction of new spectrum (general wireless
communication services, or GWCS) to offer whatever services made
40business sense.
Despite these reforms, deregulation to date has been unevenly
applied. While holders of GWCS licenses possess something resembling a
true property right, broadcasting remains subject to the traditional
command-and-control system. Other types of spectrum, such as the
original 800 megahertz (MHz) cellular bands, are left with a hybrid legacy
of vague property rights and continuing command-and-control regulation.
FCC regulation of the spectrum today is characterized by a patchwork of
distinct, and analytically contradictory, administrative regimes for
different technologies.
B. Inefficiencies ofAdministrative Spectrum Allocation
The perpetuation of command-and-control spectrum administration in
the U.S. lowers consumer welfare by preventing license-holders from
maximizing the value of their spectrum. Essentially, the existing
administrative system restricts value maximization by restricting license
Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G4-3874, 1991) (discussing spectrum
demand created by new wireless communication technologies).
36 See In re An Inquiry into the Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz and 870-890 MHz for
Cellular Communications Systems, 90 F.C.C.2d 571 (1982).
37 See generally EVAN R. KWEREL & JOHN R. WILLIAMS, CHANGING CHANNELS:
VOLUNTARY REALLOCATION OF UHF TELEVISION SPECTRUM (Office of Plans & Policies, FCC
Working Paper No. 27, 1992).
38 See H.R. BUDGET COMMITTEE REPORT NO. 103-111, at 245-70 (1993).
39 See In re Geographic Partitioning and Spectrum Disaggregation by Commercial Mobile
Radio Licensees, II F.C.C.R. 21,831 (1996).
40 See In re Allocation of Spectrum Below 5 GHz Transferred from Federal Government
Use, II F.C.C.R. 624 (1995). The 25 MHz of spectrum in the 4660-4685 MHz band was transferred
from federal government to private sector use and was allocated to the fixed and mobile services in the
First Report and Order in this proceeding, adopted February 7, 1995. See In re Allocation of Spectrum
Below 5 GHz Transferred from Federal Government Use, 10 F.C.C.R. 4769 (1995).
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transferability and the application of certain technology. To the extent that
value is not maximized, consumer welfare is diminished.'
The welfare costs generated by the current administrative allocation
of spectrum take various forms. First, by assigning frequencies to
particular uses, the current spectrum administration distorts technological
change, leading equipment producers to develop equipment for the
allowed use, irrespective of whether that is the most efficient way of
utilizing the given spectrum. The fact that equipment innovation tends to
conform to regulatory specifications implies that we currently have a stock
of equipment that can be utilized less flexibly across frequency bands than
would have been the case if the market had determined the use for each
frequency band.
Second, by restricting license resale, the administrative system
prevents value maximization in the use of spectrum. For example, despite
the fact that the cellular spectrum is in the same frequency neighborhood
as the TV spectrum, the FCC does not permit spectrum originally assigned
to UHF TV to be used for other higher-value purposes, such as cellular
telephony.42 The social welfare cost of this single restriction is enormous.
In a ground-breaking study, FCC economists estimated that, in Los
Angeles alone, as of 1992 "[t]he voluntary reallocation of a single UHF
television channel from broadcasting operations to a third cellular system
would likely increase social welfare by over one billion dollars., 43 This
estimate reflects the reallocation of a mere six MHz, given that in 1992 a
single MHz zoned for UHF TV could have been purchased for $6 million,
while a nearly identical MHz zoned for cellular service would have been
valued at $70-$160 million.44 The higher valuation of this spectrum when
used for a different purpose illustrates the large social cost generated by
administrative restrictions on spectrum assignability.
Third, the inherent passivity and slowness of the command-and-
control system delays consumer access to new technology. Recall our
previous discussion of the introduction of cellular service in the United
States.45 It took about two decades for the FCC to authorize cellular
service and "pry loose 110 MHz of upper UHF TV from the
broadcasters. 46 In 1981, the FCC licensed commercial cellular radio
41 Spectrum licenses are really nothing more than factors of production, and as with any
factor of production, preventing a Pareto-superior transaction will generally tend to reduce social
welfare.
42 See KWEREL & WILLIAMS, supra note 37, at 2.
43 Id. at 8.
44 See id. at 8.
45 See supra notes 28734 and accompanying text.
46 GEORGE CALHOUN, WIRELESS ACCESS AND THE LOCAL TELEPHONE NETWORK 580
(1992). Calhoun points out that that the FCC fashioned SMR, cellular and other allocations from this
single concession from broadcasters. See id.
60
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telephone service, designating forty MHz of spectrum in the 800 MHz
frequency band for two competing cellular systems in each market.47
However, the FCC decided to use the process of comparative hearings for
the first thirty markets, whenever there was more than one applicant (and
there were many such cases). 48 Although the slowness of the process
induced the FCC to hold lotteries for the remaining markets,49 operation
did not begin for most major markets until 1984, by which time the
technical framework for cellular put in place by the FCC was becoming
obsolete.5° Rural markets experienced even greater delays; the issuance of
licenses for rural cellular systems did not begin until 1989, and was not
fully completed until 1997."
Thus, the inefficiency of the FCC's regulatory regime significantly
impeded the growth of cellular services in the U.S., as compared to other
countries. 52 In the Nordic countries, for example, cellular technology was
introduced earlier, with Sweden and Norway initiating service in 1981, and
Denmark and Finland in 1982.5' As a consequence of the earlier
introduction of cellular service, the current penetration in the Nordic
countries stands at roughly twice that of the United States. These
penetration rates are outlined in Table 1.54
47 See In re An Inquiry into the Use of Bands 825-845 MHz & 870-890 MHz for Cellular
Communications Systems, 86 F.C.C.2d 469, 478 (1981).
48 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
49 See FCC, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SPECTRUM AUCTIONS, FCC 97-353, at 7 (1997)
[hereinafter FCC REPORT TO CONGRESS].
50 See CALHOUN, supra note 46, at 580.
51 See KELLOGG ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW, supra note 5, § 13.51, at 676. The
rural cellular licensing was completed with the FCC's 1997 cellular unserved auction. See FCC
REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 49, at II tbl.1. For an overview of the cellular licensing timeline
and the relative speed of different licensing methods, see FCC REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 49,
at 6-10 & app. E (1997).
52 See CALHOUN, supra note 46, at 580.
53 See DONALDSON, LUFKIN & JENRETTE, supra note 1, at 64-65; see also G. Todd Hardy,
Emerging Wireless Technologies: PCN and DBS, in CABLE TELEVISION LAW 1991, 337, 394 n.3 (PLI
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series G4-3863, 1991)
(describing Sweden, Norway and Finland as having "mature" cellular markets in comparison to those
in the U.S.).
54 Data from DONALDSON, LUFKIN & JENRETTE, supra note 1, at 64-65.
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TABLE 1
Comparison of Cellular Penetration Rates in Selected Countries






United States 1984 25.1%
Italy 1985 23.3%
United Kingdom 1985 15.5%
Germany 1985 11.5%
France 1985 11.3%
By distorting technological change, preventing value-maximization of
spectrum, and delaying consumer access to new technology, the current
command-and-control administrative system generates significant
consumer welfare costs. A property rights system would ameliorate these
inefficiencies by tapping the self-interest of spectrum holders, allowing
them to determine the most effective, and lucrative, use for the spectrum
they hold.
C. Administrative Resistance to a Property Rights Approach
As illustrated above, the FCC saddles society with a significant loss
in welfare by restricting access, usage, and transfer of spectrum.
Regulators defend such restrictions primarily by arguing that they are
necessary to prevent interference in the spectrum. However, interference
could be prevented just as effectively by a property rights system enforced
through tort law. In fact, it is far more likely that regulators' real interest in
perpetuating the existing spectrum administration stems from their desire
to maintain the steady flow of political rents generated by control over
Vol. 16:53, 1999
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spectrum.
The rationale offered for restricting access is the traditional "tragedy
of the commons" argument. 55 Without access restrictions, regulators assert,
operators will interfere with one another as they did during the "free for
all" period in the early 19 0 0s. 56 Regulators also impose usage restrictions
that tie the right to use a specific spectrum to a particular application and
technology,57 arguing that without usage limitations the potential for
interference is too great. However, few, if any, good reasons exist for
limiting the uses enterprising spectrum holders may find for the specific
bands.
The interference rationale also provides little support for government
restrictions on the transfer of licenses, given that the aggregate number of
licenses would remain the same, but the licenses would merely be
transferred to operators able to maximize the value of the corresponding
spectrum. Rather than increasing interference, such trades provide a
mechanism for the market to correct mistakes that may have been made in
the initial command-and-control allocation, and help direct spectrum to its
most profitable use. Thus, there is scant economic justification for
restricting the transfer of spectrum rights.58
Moreover, irrespective of the merits of the interference arguments
themselves, limiting interference does not require traditional command-
and-control regulation. A much simpler method, which we discuss in more
detail below, is to create a full-fledged spectrum property right,59 granting
the spectrum holder the right to use a particular band in any way in a
particular geographic area, subject to certain limits on outputs, such as
signal to noise ratios.60 Once a property rights system is implemented,
55 See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
56 For a good discussion of this period, see Hazlett, supra note 5, at 135-65.
57 See, e.g., In re Allocation of Spectrum Below 5 GHz Transferred from Federal
Government Use, 10 F.C.C.R. 4769, 4, at 4772 (1995).
58 One possible non-economic explanation for regulators' desire to restrict resale of licenses
is their desire to shield themselves from public criticism when operators who initially received
spectrum allocations, often for only a nominal fee, immediately resold them for millions of dollars on
the open market. By forcing the licensee to build out the license, and wait a respectable amount of time
before selling the property, it becomes difficult to disentangle the original value of the spectrum from
the value of the assets and customer base added by the licensee, and to determine how much of the
original licensee's gains resulted from business acumen, as opposed to regulatory fiat. In this way, the
regulator can insulate herself from charges that a national resource was given away.
59 Many commentators have suggested various property rights systems. See, e.g., PETER
HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC AND LET COMMON LAW RULE THE
TELECOSM (1997); Robert J. Crandall, New Zealand Spectrum Policy: A Modelfor the United States?,
41 J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming 1999) (working copy on file with author); Arthur S. De Vany et al., A
Property System for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-
Engineering Study, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1499 (1969); Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A
Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207 (1982); Hazlett, supra note 5;
Comment, "Public Interest" and the Market in Color Television Regulation, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 802
(1951).
60 See De Vany et al., supra note 59, at 145-62. The output is the strength of the broadcast
63
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interference could be handled through access to tort law. As long as
individuals or entities may be sued and fined for trespassing on another's
spectrum rights, spectrum users will have incentives to respect the rights of
their spectrum neighbors.
Given that the interference rationale does not justify access, usage,
and resale restrictions on spectrum, political economy considerations
explain more accurately why restrictions on spectrum utilization are
almost ubiquitous regulatory forms: Their purpose is to redistribute rents
or garner political power. 61 These considerations explain why a regulator
might oppose a minor change that would surely seem to promote consumer
welfare. The regulator has it in her power to protect the rents of
incumbent providers threatened by the change, or, alternatively, to extract
some of the substantial windfall gains accruing to the licensee from the
modification. The extraction of these rents can take various forms; since
the licensee is willing to pay for the license modification, payments may
take the form of direct monetary transfers to the treasury, political
payments contributions, or any combination of the two.
The FCC's' approach to the licensing of high-definition television
(HDTV) provides an excellent example. By many estimates, the HDTV
spectrum was worth tens of billions of dollars to incumbent U.S.
broadcasters.62 Proceeds from license sales, however, do not remain with
the FCC, but are passed on to the Treasury Department.63 A considerable
divergence therefore exists between the FCC's private interest and the
societal interest, causing regulators to make decisions that maximize their
own welfare. Thus, while raising billions by auctioning spare TV,
frequencies might ensure the agency some fleeting praise during the
congressional budget process, continuing control over the allocation of the
HDTV spectrum empowers regulators to bargain with the private sector
for politically important concessions. For example, it is plausible to
signal in the licensee's coverage area and in neighboring areas. An interference problem arises when
licensee A's signal in area B is so strong relative to licensee B's own signal that the signal-to-noise
ratio experienced by B's receivers is unacceptable. Thus, interference provisions are better specified in
terms of outputs.
61 For a foundational exposition of this account of economic regulation, see George J.
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCi. 3 (1971); see also
sources cited infra note 65.
62 See, e.g., Charles Platt, The Great HDTV Swindle, WIRED, Feb. 1997, at 57, 60 (noting
that the FCC estimated the value of the HDTV spectrum at $11-70 billion); cf Digital Television:
Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Reed
Hundt, Chairman, FCC) (criticizing the Congressional Budget Office estimate of $10 billion for the
value of the HDTV spectrum).
63 See Comments on the FCC's Fiscal Year 1998 Budget Estimates: Before the House
Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary of the Comm. on Appropriations, 105th Cong.,
available in 1997 FCC LEXIS 1300, *17-18 (1997) (statement of Reed Hundt, Chairman, FCC)
(arguing that, since FCC auction proceeds are immediately deposited with the Treasury Department,
• collection responsibility should be tumed over to the Treasury Department as well).
64
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imagine that the TV industry might be more likely to agree to a V-chip
(allowing parents to screen children's TV viewing patterns), despite its
belief that depictions of sex and violence sell quite well, if it could obtain
in return a few dozens of MHz of HDTV, at least nominally for free.
Likewise, regulators could endear themselves both to politicians and to the
broadcast industry by guaranteeing free airtime to political incumbents in
return for ceding vast swaths of spectrum to broadcasters at no charge. 64
The regulator's prospects of promotion to a more powerful agency or a
high-powered private sector job may also suddenly improve. Even if
government were monolithic, it is not difficult to imagine that the lure of
free propaganda on private airwaves might induce a government to give
immensely valuable "ethereal real estate" to broadcasters.65
In short, regulators resist deregulating spectrum, including removing
license restrictions, as a means of perpetuating their own importance, if not
their very existence. Implementing a property rights system would remove
the ability of politicians to use spectrum allocation for political benefits,
and would put a large proportion of the regulatory staff, not to mention
lobbyists and lawyers, out of work.66 As one commentator noted, "genuine
deregulation would disrupt the cozy codependence that has existed for
decades between broadcasters and Congress, and Congress and the FCC,
and the FCC and broadcasters. 67
Fortunately, the swelling demand for spectrum brought on by
extensive technological change has forced the FCC to deregulate some
areas of spectrum administration. In particular, the FCC has been bending
its procedures in response to substantial pressure from wireless operators
who have lobbied the FCC to relax its rules concerning license resale,
band fragmentation, and usage changes. 6' For example, the FCC has
64 See Mark Landler, Capitol Hill Fiat on HDTV Isn't the Last Word, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,
1996, at DI (quoting a speech by FCC Chairman Reed Hundt suggesting that broadcasters devote at
least 5% of the airtime on these channels to, for example, children's programs or free time for political
candidates). Eventually the FCC settled on extracting three hours of children's educational
programming per week. See Harry A. Jersell, The Fall of the First, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug.
12, 1996, at 11.
65 We refer readers to the sizable literature on rational choice theory that explains
government policy as the outcome of policymakers' attempts to maximize reelection chances, power,
budget, etc. See, e.g., PETER A. ARANSON, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: STRATEGY AND CHOICE
(1981); DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (2d ed., 1989); GLEN 0. ROBINSON, AMERICAN
BUREAUCRACY: PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 80-87 (1991).
66 While it might increase the workload on judges, it is likely than many fewer lawyers
would be needed to litigate these cases than to navigate the FCC's byzantine regulations.
67 Platt, supra note 62, at 191.
68 The Commission received submissions from over 50 organizations and individuals in
response to a notice and rulemaking on the regulatory status of Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR)
systems, including submissions from twenty-eight congressmen, including Senators Bums, D'Amato,
Feinstein, Gramm, Helms, Lieberman, and Specter. See In re Amendment of Part 90 of the
Commission's Rules To Facilitate Future Development of SMR Systems in the 800 MHz Frequency
Band, 12 F.C.C.R. 19,079, app. A, at 19,175 (1997).
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allowed both the partitioning of spectrum bands and their sublease and
resale to third parties for an increasing number of telecommunications
applications, such as broadband PCS, 69 Multipoint Distribution Service
(MDS),7 ° 800 MHz and 900 MHz Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR),71 39
GHz fixed point-to-point microwave,72 Wireless Communications Service
(WCS), 73  Local Multipoint Distribution Service (LMDS),7 4  Direct
Broadcast Satellite (DBS) 75  and Maritime Services. 7 6  The FCC is
considering extending geographic partitioning and spectrum
77 71disaggregation to other services, including paging,77 cellular service,
GWCS, 79 and narrowband PCS.80 The FCC has also allowed Nextel to
provide wireless digital service over frequencies that were originally
licensed for radio dispatch services 8I and has granted PCS licensees
substantial flexibility in their technologies to design and implement PCS
82
systems.
The FCC also has responded to increased spectrum demand through
expanded use of spectrum license auctions. The congressional mandate to
69 See In re Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal Communications Services, 9
F.C.C.R. 4957, 157-158, at 5020 (1994).
70 See In re Amendment of Parts 21 and 74 of the Commission's Rules with Regard to
Filing Procedures in the Multipoint Distribution Service and in the Instructional Television Fixed
Service, 10 F.C.C.R. 9589, 9 46-47, at 9614-15 (1995).
71 See In re Amendment of Part 90 of the Commission's Rules To Facilitate Future
Development of SMR Systems in the 800 MHz Frequency Band, 12 F.C.C.R. 19,079, 138-227, at
19,127-53 (1997).
72 See In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules Regarding the 37.0-38.6 GHz and 38.6-
40.0 GHz Bands, 12 F.C.C.R. 18,600, 70-74, at 18,634-36 (1997).
73 See In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules To Establish Part 27, the Wireless
Communications Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 10,785, 92-103, at 10,834-39 (Supp. 1997).
74 See In re Rulemaking To Amend Parts 1, 2, 21, and 25 of the Commission's Rules To
Redesignate the 27.5-29.5 GHz Frequency Band, To Reallocate the 29.5-30,0 GHz Frequency Band,
To Establish Rules and Policies for Local Multipoint Distribution Service and for Fixed Satellite
Services, 13 F.C.C.R. 11,655 (1998).
75 See In re Revision of Rules and Policies for the Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, 11
F.C.C.R. 9712, 179-180, at 9785 (1995), affd sub nom. DIRECTV, Inc. v. FCC, 110 F.3d 816 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
76 See In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules Concerning Maritime Communications,
FCC 98-151, available in 1998 FCC LEXIS 3381, 37-43, at *52 (1998).
77 See In re Revision of Part 22 and Part 90 of the Commission's Rules To Facilitate Future
Development of Paging Systems, 12 F.C.C.R. 2732, 99 188-194, at 2815-18, 99 203-218, at 2821-26
(1997).
78 See In re Geographic Partitioning and Spectrum Disaggregation by Commercial Mobile
Radio Service Licensees, 11 F.C.C.R. 21,831, 95, at 21,876 (1996).
79 See id. 96, at 21,876. See also In re Allocation of Spectrum Below 5 GHz Transferred
from Federal Government Use, I I F.C.C.R. 624, 105, at 665 (1995).
80 See In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules To Establish New Personal
Communications Services, Narrowband PCS, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,972, 87-99, at 13,014-18 (1997).
81 See In re Amendment of Part 90 of the Commission's Rules To Facilitate Future
Development of SMR Systems in the 800 MHz Frequency Band, 8 F.C.C:R. 3950, 4, at 3951 (1993).
82 See In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules To Establish New Personal
Communications Services, 8 F.C.C.R. 7700, 99 135-186, at 7755-78 (1993).
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auction spectrum was introduced in the budget bill of 1993 .83 Although
pundits and scholars alike have attached much importance to the shift
towards auctions, 84 it is unclear whether auctions by themselves are that
important a regulatory change. Auctions are clearly superior to the prior
procedures for assigning spectrum licenses-whether by lotteries or by
administrative hearings-in that they reduce some of the transaction costs
associated with transferring the licenses to those that can best use them,
particularly if the FCC continues to restrict the ease with which licenses
can be transferred. However, auctioning service licenses does not change
the overall nature of the FCC spectrum allocation, which still restricts
access and usage changes. Although the licensee will probably be the
operator with the highest current valuation for the object, the licensee will
still be restricted in her ability to change services, to fragment the
spectrum, and in general to adapt to future technological and market
conditions.
The FCC's recent deregulatory steps serve the FCC's interest by
addressing pressure for licensing reform without altering the FCC's
control over key access, usage, and transfer decisions. Although the FCC's
limited deregulation has enhanced short-term consumer welfare to some
degree, this modest reform more problematically has allowed the FCC to
leave the command-and-control system largely in place, preventing long-
term value maximization of the spectrum. Accordingly, what the U.S.
needs is a more drastic change in its regulatory approach, similar to the
property rights approaches implemented in Guatemala and New Zealand.
We examine their experiences in Part III.
II. A Property Rights Approach to Spectrum Allocation
A. Overview
The idea of a property rights approach to spectrum allocation is not
new. The first to suggest a property rights approach was Leo Herzel in his
1951 article on the regulation of color television.85 Professor Herzel's
86ideas did not fare well, nor did Ronald Coase's writings on the subject.Indeed, it took thirty-seven years for these ideas to take root in any piece
83 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 47 U.S.C. § 3090)(1) (1994).
84 See, e.g., Nicholas W. Allard, The New Spectrum Auction Law, 18 SETON HALL LEG. J.
13 (1993).
85 See Comment, supra note 59, at 811-16. For Herzel's assessment of how he reached his
conclusions, see Leo Herzel, My 1951 Color Television Article, 41 J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming 1999).
86 See R.H. Coase, The Federal Conmmunications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959); see
also Ronald Coase, Comment on Thomas W. Hazlett, 41 J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming 1999) (containing
Coase's assessment of his FCC article).
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of legislation. The first legislation that utilized the idea of a property rights
approach to spectrum use was the 1989 Radio Communications Act of
New Zealand, which introduced the concept of tradable rights as a
substitute for administrative licensing schemes.87 Seven years later, El
Salvador and Guatemala introduced legislation expanding the idea of
tradable rights.88 Differing from New Zealand, in both El Salvador and
Guatemala all spectrum currently unassigned to broadcasters became
subject to licensing under unrestricted tradable permits.
B. The Basic Building Blocks
To understand the importance of these regulatory changes, we must
first identify the structural foundation that will permit the development of
a market for unrestricted tradable permits in spectrum. There are three
basic building blocks for the creation of a working market in tradable
spectrum permits: (1) the right to sell, fragment, or lease the spectrum (i.e.
the right to property); (2) the right to use the assigned spectrum, as
opposed to the right to provide a service; and (3) the handling of
interference problems (i.e. the prevention of trespassing). We discuss them
in turn.
1. Right to Property
The traditional administrative assignment of spectrum rights specifies
the use for the spectrum, the frequency band, the time of broadcasting, the
power and location of the transmitting facility (including, where
appropriate, its directionality), and the location of the receiving antenna.89
This right could be construed as property if it could be sold at will.9°
87 See Radiocommunications Act, 1989, No. 148 (vol. 4. page 2297) (N.Z.). For a
discussion of the New Zealand auctions, see Crandall, supra note 59.
88 The authors helped design the reforms of the telecommunication sectors and draft the
telecommunications laws passed in 1996 by the legislatures of both countries. See Ley de
Telecomunicaciones, D.O., 9 de octobre de 1996 (El Sal.); Ley General de Telecomunicaciones,
D.C.A., 18 de noviembre de 1996 (Guat.).
89 See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. §§ 22.900-22.967 (1997). Note that PCS are regulated differently and
are subject to Part 24 of the Code of Federal Regulations, see 47 C.F.R. §§ 24.200-24.253 (1997),
while SMR providers are regulated under Part 90, see 47 C.F.R. §§ 90.601-90.913 (1997). Broadcast
services are subject to an entirely different set of rules under Part 73. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1-73.4280
(1997).
90 Some rights would not have greater value in alternative use. For example, a right to a
point-to-point transmission over a certain frequency from the headquarters of a particular company to
one of its branches would have very little value in alternative use, as a buyer interested in using that
right for an alternative use also will have to obtain the right to retransmit from the two end-points to
the two end-points in which the buyer is interested. Under other conditions, a right could be very
valuable, in particular if the permits involve broadcasting services, like radio, TV, satellite, or mobile
telephony licenses of any sort.
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By contrast, a property rights approach to the spectrum simply would
grant the right to transmit over a particular frequency band over a
particular geographic area. This right, however, is not enough to assure
flexibility and innovation. For spectrum to be transferred to its highest
value use, this right must be transferable, as well as fragmentable, which in
turn requires that the right be specified not in terms of service, but rather in
terms of usage or outputs.
2. Right to Use
Traditional licensing regimes award the licensee the right to provide a
specific service using a particular frequency band-and nothing more. For
example, UHF TV licensees only have the right to provide UHF TV
broadcasting over the designated frequencies.9 Should the licensee desire
to use the same airwaves to provide a service not expressly permitted by
federal regulations, specific authorization must be obtained from the FCC.
Under a property rights system, this right to provide a service would
be replaced by a general right to use, granting the licensee the ultimate
choice of application of the spectrum. Only in the absence of usage
restrictions can a licensee maximize the value of spectrum. Additionally,
the right to determine to what use the spectrum will be put is an important
driving force behind the development of new technologies.
To some extent, shifting towards a right to use would be one of the
most drastic departures from the standard administrative allocation
process. As discussed previously, only recently, and only for very
specified spectrum bands, has the FCC provided some service flexibility to
licensees.92 However, even in the case of PCS, the license is restricted to
the provision of commercial radio service-traditional broadcasting (such
as TV or radio) is expressly prohibited.93 Although this does not cause a
problem at present, as this is currently the highest value usage for those
radio frequencies, it might in the future, when a higher value use is
discovered for that spectrum. Although the FCC has moved to some extent
towards a .right-of-use doctrine, the move has been haphazard, hesitant,
and ad-hoc.
91 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
92 The FCC, for example, reclassified SMR licenses as Commercial Mobile Radio Service
(CMRS) licenses, permitting dynamic sharing and interconnection to the Public Switch Telephone
Network (PSTN) of dispatch radio channels. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 47
U.S.C. § 332 (1994).
93 See 47 C.F.R. § 24.229(d) (1997) (setting forth the spectrum allocations for commercial
radio service); § 24.3 (expressly prohibiting PCS licensees from engaging in "broadcasting as defined
by the Communications Act").
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3. Handling Interference
The laws of physics do not allow for an easy definition of the
boundaries of the right to transmit. This is particularly problematic for two
of the three dimensions of the right: the geographic area and the spectrum
band. However, as discussed below, interference problems could be
handled under a property rights system by specifying a reference signal
strength and a maximum signal strength for broadcasts, and allowing right
holders themselves to utilize tort law to protect their broadcast rights
against trespassers.
The important characteristic of a broadcast signal is the received
signal to noise ratio (SNR), because its information content (broadly
speaking, its quality to the end user) is a logarithmic function of the
received signal to noise ratio, as specified by Shannon's Law:94 As the
signal progressively weakens relative to surrounding noise, degradation
accelerates. Currently, part of the FCC's engineering function is to provide
SNR protection.95 When a request for a new transmitter license comes in,
the FCC plugs into its engineering models data on all the surrounding
transmitters, plus the new one,96 and attempts to compute whether existing
licensees' SNR will be adversely affected and whether sufficiently good
SNR can be given to the petitioner.97
Under a property rights system, detailed SNR engineering by
regulators is rendered unnecessary by simply distributing the SNR rights
and letting the spectrum holders determine how to use their spectrum
without infringing on their neighbors' rights. A right holder's basic limits
are the rights of the other right holders. Each holder's right to transmit free
of interference limits the spectrum uses of other right holders. However,
the concept "free of interference" is not well defined, and will depend on
the power level at which individual spectrum holders choose to broadcast.
A right holder who uses her spectrum for a very low power application
will receive interference from multiple sources. Thus, to avoid being
interfered with, and to avoid interfering with others, the right to transmit
over a particular geographic area, time, and spectrum band must be limited
by a set of minimal technical parameters.
The necessary technical parameters are the reference signal strength
and the maximum signal strength. The first parameter, reference signal
strength, is measured in practice by the field strength (FS). 98 Provided that
94 "Shannon's Law" is set forth in C.E. Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of
Communication (pts. I & 2), 27 BELL SYS. TECH. J. 379 (1948); 27 BELL Sys. TECH. J. 623 (1948).
95 See 47 C.F.R § 24.237 (1997).
96 See id
97 See, e.g. In re Commission's Rules To Establish New Personal Communications
Services, 9 F.C.C.R. 4957, 186, at 5030 (1994).
98 The FCC often prescribes maximum field-strength limits. See 47 C.F.R. § 27.55 (1997).
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the right holder maintains her minimum FS, she enjoys a right to the
minimum acceptable SNR. These two parameters, in turn, determine the
maximum strength of the background noise.
The second parameter, maximum signal strength, is necessary
because noise from multiple sources is cumulative, and it would be
difficult to determine what source is creating the quality degradation. This
noise externality would rapidly escalate power levels, as users try to drown
out background noise with ever increasing transmitter power. The chain of
events is very similar to a crowded cocktail party, where very soon
everyone has to shout to make themselves heard over the din. The
spectrum property right, therefore, needs to specify a maximum signal
strength, measured in terms of outputs, rather than inputs. Instead of the
detailed FCC-type regulation of antenna heights and transmitter power, it
is simpler to specify (1) a maximum field strength at the boundary of the
coverage area (to protect geographically adjacent users of the same
frequency from co-channel interference), and (2) maximum levels of out-
of-band emissions (to protect users of adjacent frequency bands in the
same area from adjacent channel interference).
The framework described above provides a natural definition of a
coverage area, which could be specified in terms of a certain FS.99
Unfortunately, it remains unclear what the "natural" SNR should be for a
particular frequency band at a particular time of day in a particular
geographic location. Thus, some residual regulatory engineering is
necessary to craft the original rights, in order to ensure that the set of
original rights is not conflicting and that the defined rights are actually
useful. But that is as much as needs to be stipulated. A right holder would
be left to decide if she wanted to maintain the minimum FS (and thus
enjoy the minimum SNR protection), and whether to do this through many
small transmitters, or one large one.'00 A right holder transmitting in a
geographic area and in a spectrum band with no "neighbors," whether in
the spectrum dial or in the geographic area, can increase power
substantially without creating injurious interference. If, however, a new
right holder shows up next door, then the original right holder will have to
adjust her transmission to avoid interfering with her new neighbor.
To have a well functioning market for transmission rights, right
holders must be able to enforce such rights. The right to be free from
In the case of PCS, the field-strength limit is 47 dBuV/m. See 47 C.F.R. § 24.236 (1997).
99 The FCC already uses the field-strength contour concept to evaluate potential duopoly
situations and violations of cross-ownership restrictions, by examining the overlap of the so-called
Grade B contours (computed in accordance with 47 C.F.R. § 73.684 (1997)). See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555
(1997).
100 Changes to these technical restrictions could be adopted as long as "neighboring"
spectrum holders do not object.
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injurious interference-i.e. the right to exclude' 0 -would be defined in
terms of the technical characteristics of the spectrum right. Since the
Supreme Court's 1943 decision in FCC v. National Broadcasting
Commission (KOA), 10 2  exclusive spectrum -assignments have been
recognized as legally enforceable rights. 0 3 Thus, clear liability and
appropriate penalties would be sufficient for priyate enforcement. In the
same way that companies sue each other for patent violation or for theft of
industrial secrets, or individuals sue one another for injuries arising from
car accidents, companies could sue each other for prejudicial interference
and obtain compensation for damages. It has long been suggested that
market forces, in conjunction with contracts and property rights (with
privately enforceable protection), would limit interference successfully,
and in any case demonstrably better than the government has in the past.
0 4
Furthermore, under a property rights system, right holders could collect
damages from trespassers. Thus, unlike the current system, right holders
would have an extra incentive to find and prosecute those broadcasters that
interfere with their transmission rights.
C. The Government's Role Under a Property Rights Approach
The government would still retain a limited role under a property
rights approach. As discussed earlier,'0 5 some regulatory engineering
would be necessary to craft the new spectrum property rights.
Additionally, an official record of who owns what portion of the spectrum
would still have to be maintained. 0 6 Although the FCC in theory could
serve as the adjudicator of spectrum property rights disputes, more than a
half-century of micromanaging broadcasters, common carriers, and
wireless operators would not pass away easily. Indeed, this concern has led
Peter Huber to argue that the FCC should be abolished and that all
spectrum matters should be delegated to common law.'
0 7
101 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) ("[The right to exclude is]
one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.").
102 319 U.S. 239 (1943).
103 See id.
104 See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 59, at 207-26 (containing former Chairman of the FCC
Mark Fowler's critique of the social inefficiency of the current administrative system).
105 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
106 The FCC has recognized this important role and has stepped up its efforts to increase the
availability of spectrum licensing information. See In re Biennial Regulatory Review-Amendment of
Parts 0, 1, 13, 22, 24, 26, 27, 80, 87, 90, 95, 97, and 101 of the Commission's Rules To Facilitate the
Development and Use of the Universal Licensing System in the Wireless Telecommunications
Services, 13 F.C.C.R. 21,027, 143, at 21,091 (1998). While this record-keeping function also
arguably could be delegated to private entities, a public information clearinghouse may exhibit strong
returns to scale as well as public good characteristics. Additionally, one might want to avoid
conflicting attribution of property rights by two or more competing private registries.
107 See HUBER, supra note 59.
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We believe the responsibility for adjudicating spectrum property
rights disputes should lie with the judiciary. 10 8 Lay courts could take
advantage of the FCC's knowledge of spectrum interference issues by
appointing FCC staff members as Special Masters. However, legislation
may be required to counteract the D.C. Circuit's recent ruling in United
States v. Microsoft Corp.,0 9 which held that the "browser war" litigation
was not complex enough to warrant the appointment of a Special
Master.' "
11. International Experience with the Introduction of Spectrum Property
Rights
Reviewing the international experience with spectrum property rights
is a useful first step in determining how the U.S. might engineer the
transition to a full-fledged property rights system. The experiences of New
Zealand and Guatemala, in particular, may illuminate advantages and
disadvantages of differing approaches to important elements of a property
rights system, such as the initial assignment of spectrum rights, the
policing of interference, and the relative productivity of spectrum uses.
A. The New Zealand Experience
New Zealand's 1989 Radiocommunications Act established the first
experiment with spectrum property rights."' The Act authorized the
Ministry of Commerce to introduce tradable rights as a substitute for the
traditional administrative assignment process.' 12 This scheme has been
called the "spectrum management" approach.1 3 In this approach, spectrum
segments are sold to spectrum managers, who in turn resell or rent to third
parties the right to utilize their spectrum." 4
108 If the courts prove ineffective adjudicators of spectrum disputes, alternative methods of
resolving prejudicial interference could be designed. For example, Guatemala developed an
administrative procedure to resolve interference disputes. See Reglamento para la explotaci6n de
sistemas satelitales en Guatemala, D.C.A, 2 de septiembre de 1998 (Guat.). To make this process
effective, all transmission devices have to be registered with the spectrum agency, so that presumed
violators could be identified. See id. art 15.
109 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
110 See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 956 (vacating the appointment of Special Master Lawrence
Lessig by Order of Reference to Special Master in United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980 F.Supp. 537,
545 (D.D.C. 1997)). The Appeals Court noted that 'A reference to a master shall be the exception and
not the rule. In actions . . . to be tried without a jury, save in matters of account and of difficult
computation of damages, a reference shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional
condition requires it."' Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 953 n.21 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b)).
Ill See Radiocommunications Act, 1989, No. 148 (vol. 4, page 2297) (N.Z.).
112 See Radiocommunications Act § 12 (N.Z.).
113 See Crandall, supra note 59, at 23.
114 See Radiocommunications Act § 98 (N.Z.).
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Since the passage of the 1989 Radiocommunications Act, New
Zealand has moved relatively slowly toward a property rights system. It
has sold only a small amount of the spectrum to private individuals under
the spectrum management approach, using mostly simultaneous second
(and later, first) price auctions.' 1 5 Most spectrum, however, is still
allocated under the old administrative process.'
16
Although the initiative has succeeded in transferring the
administration of segments of the broadcasting spectrum to the private
sector, there have been substantial problems. First, spectrum managers
thus far have failed to do much management, with few resale or rent
transactions taking place."' Crandall reports that the Multipoint
Distribution Service (MDS) management rights lie almost completely
fallow,"' despite the fact that their holders each paid up to $800,000 for
the rights.'' 9
Second, the sealed-bid auction mechanism utilized by the Ministry of
Commerce created substantial price differences for similar rights. 20 Due
to the second price mechanism employed in this auction, the winner with
the highest bid would only be required to pay the amount of the second-
highest bid. As a result, some bidders paid less than half their winning
bid, '2 and one bidder even obtained a license for zero price.
22
Although the reasons underlying the malfunctioning of the auction
system are clear, the lack of substantial subsequent private reassignment of
the spectrum is less easily explained. One possible explanation is that the
spectrum management approach may have been applied in the wrong
bands. Another possibility is that the bands for which spectrum
management would work best are those where the standard administrative
assignment would be most difficult, such as point-to-point uses.
Alternatively, it could simply be the case that there was little total demand
in New Zealand for the spectrum carrying the property rights. Indeed, New
Zealand's low population density 23 suggests a general lack of spectrum
115 See Crandall, supra note 59, at 11-12.
116 See Crandall, supra note 59, at 10-11.
117 See Crandall, supra note 59, at 24.
118 There have been only minor uses for non-video transmission. See Crandall, supra note
59, at 22.
119 See NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, RADIOCOMMUNICATIONS ACT REVIEW
DISCUSSION PAPER: PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS, app. 2 (1995), available in
<http://www.moc.govt.nz/rsm/actreview/actr_96.html> (visited Dec. 4, 1998) [hereinafter N.Z.
DISCUSSION PAPER].
120 See Crandall, supra note 59, at 1 I-12.
121 See John McMillan, Selling Spectrum Rights, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1994, at 145,
148.
122 This was the case of a college student who bid for a TV license for a small city. Since no
one else bid, the license was granted at the price of the putative second-highest bid, i.e. zero price. See
id.
123 The population density of New Zealand is only 34 persons per square mile. See THE
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scarcity, with large quantities of spectrum still subject to traditional
administrative assignment.
In summary, the New Zealand experiment most convincingly
illustrates potential pitfalls in implementing a property rights approach.
New Zealand's experience does not, however, offer much guidance for the
implementation of a property rights system in the U.S., because (1) the
system was only implemented in certain limited bands, (2) the auction
process had deficiencies, and (3) the country itself has a quite low
population density, suggesting a relatively small degree of spectrum
scarcity. In these three respects, Guatemala's experience may be more
instructive, especially as Guatemala benefited from the practical auction
experience of New Zealand, Australia, and, especially, the United States
and Mexico.
B. The Guatemala Experience
In 1996, the Guatemalan National Assembly enacted a new
telecommunications law, 124  completely deregulating the spectrum
market,'25 allowing free entry into all segments of telecommunications,26
and requiring operators to grant competitive interconnection.2 7 A key part
of the Act required that all new spectrum allocations be made through a
property rights system. 28 Spectrum rights are now granted in fully
transferable and fragmentable frequency usage titles (Titulos de Usufructo
de Frecuencias, or TUFs).129 The TUFs have no service limitation, but
carry technical limitations to protect against prejudicial interference. 30
The basic building block of Guatemala's approach to the spectrum is
that all spectrum not currently assigned to the government,' 3' to radio and
TV stations, 132 or to other license holders,13 and not set aside as "free,"
can be requested by any person. 3 4 If the regulatory agency determines that
a request does not infringe on any other existing license holders' rights, a
WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1998, 803 (Robert Famighetti et al. eds.). By contrast, the
population density of the U.S. is 72 persons per square mile. See id. at 832.
124 See Ley General de Telecomunicaciones, D.C.A., 14 de noviembre de 1996 (Guat.).
125 See id. arts. 22 & 26.
126 See id. art. 51.
127 See id. art. 28.
128 See id. art. 54.
129 See id. arts. 54-57.
130 See id. art. 57.
131 See id. art. 95.
132 Radio and TV stations were grandfathered, and were granted fully transferable rights of
use to their spectrum bands. See id. art. 96.
133 Private concession holders could only continue those services they were actually
providing at the time of enactment, and would not be able to renew their concession upon expiration.
See id. art. 94.
134 See id. art. 54.
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period of public comment begins, allowing other interested parties to
object to the granting of the right. 3 1 Objections may be raised for two
reasons. First, the objector may already own a right that would be violated
by the request. 36 If such a protest is substantiated, the request is not
granted.' Second, the objector may also want a portion of the requested
spectrum, 8 in which case the regulator must initiate an auction
procedure. 139 The law requires that, if fragmentation would promote
competition, regulators must auction the requested spectrum in a
fragmented fashion, following a simultaneous, ascending multiple-round
auction format.
140
Since the law entered into effect in January, 1997, the regulatory
agency has received more than 10,000 requests for spectrum use rights.'
41
Although the law provides approximately four months as the maximum
interval between request and auction,141 the law does not penalize the
agency for delays. As a consequence, the auction process has been
somewhat attenuated. Nevertheless, the Guatemalan Superintendencia de
Telecomunicaciones has accomplished the laudable feat of conducting
thirty-eight spectrum auctions in its brief two years of existence. 143
1. The Specialized Mobile Radio Auction
144
The first auction began on June 2, 1997, and lasted for approximately
two weeks. 4 5 The auction was for 20.8 MHz of nationwide spectrum in
the 800 MHz range, which currently is used in the region for "trunking" or





140 See id. art. 62.
141 The Guatemalan regulator posts a list of the most recently received requests at Website of
Superintendencia de Telecommunicaciones de Guatemala (visited Dec. 10, 1998)
<http://www.sigloxxi.com/SlT_GUA/Sit09198/solicitud.html>.
142 See Ley General de Telecomunicaciones, art. 62 (Guat.)
143 The Superintendencia has conducted 38 auctions at the time of this writing. See Website
of Superintendencia de Telecommunicaciones de Guatemala (visited Dec. 10, 1998)
<<http://168.234.153.31/SITGUA/indexsp.html>. The last auction at the time of writing was SP-38,
which closed on October 27, 1998. The auctioned frequencies were in the 400 MHz band, most likely
for private land mobile radio, although the only restrictions placed on the rightholders were that they
maintain their broadcasts within the prescribed frequencies and with a maximum radiated power of 50
dBm, being guaranteed a SNR protection of -90 dBm. See Website of
Superintendencia de Telecommunicaciones de Guatemala (visited Dec. 10, 1998)
<http://www.sigloxxi.com/SIT_GUA/Sit091198/resSIT-SP38.html>.
144 Little documentation exists with respect to Guatemala's SMR auction or the FM auctions.
Notes on the results of these auctions are on file with the authors, who participated in the development
of Guatemala's property rights approach to spectrum, including the auction process.
145 See Website of Superintendencia de Telecommunicaciones de Guatemala (visited Dec.
10, 1998) <http://l 68.234.153.31/SITGUA/indexesp.html>.
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SMR. The 20.8 MHz of spectrum were fragmented in pairs of outbound
and inbound bands, and also in two types of band pairs, seven of one MHz
each and twelve of 200 kilohertz (kHz) each. The one MHz bands and the
200 kHz bands were contiguous. Initially, there were eleven bidders-ten
companies, including the national telecommunications company,
GUATEL, and one individual. The bidders deposited payments that
allowed them collectively to bid initially for more than sixty MHz.146 The
auction ended after two weeks of intense bidding, with total payments of
almost $3 million (17.2 million Quetzals). Seven out of the initial eleven
bidders won at least one lot.
It is interesting to compare this result to auction results in the United
States. The population of Guatemala is approximately eleven million
people; its average per capita income is just over U.S. $3,000.147 Thus, on
a per MHz-POP basis,148 the Guatemala auction resulted in a value of
approximately 1.2 U.S. cents per MHz-POP. A similar auction in the
United States has resulted in 24.5 U.S. cents per MHz-POP.
149
146 Essentially, this meant that the initial expressions of interest indicated that there was a
weighted average of 2.9 interested bidders for every property (sixty MHz divided by the 20.8 MHz
available in the auction). As prices increased in the auction, bidders dropped out until only valid bids
for 20.8 MHz remained.
147 See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1998, supra note 123, at 707.
148 MHz-POP is a convenient way of expressing the "capacity" of a license. It is the product
of the available MHz in the license and the number of inhabitants in that license territory (i.e. MHz x
population).
149 The FCC's SMR auction consisted of 20 ten-channel blocks (10 x 2 x 12.5 kHz = 250
kHz per block) in the 900 MHz band in each major trading area. The auction lasted 168 rounds,
closing in April, 1996. Notably, incumbent licensees in the band retained the right to operate under
their existing licenses and the right to co-channel and adjacent channel interference protection. The
new licensees were awarded the right to authorize expansion of existing systems. The FCC published
as part of the bidders' package its estimates of the extent of incumbency for each block, while
disclaiming any responsibility for the accuracy of this information, cautioning bidders to do their own
research. The FCC estimated that on average only three of the nominal five MHz were usable. See
SMR Fact Sheet <http://www.fcc.gov/wth/auctions/smr/smrl fact.html> (visited Jan. 10, 1998).
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TABLE 2
Comparison of SMR Auction Results in the United States and Guatemala
GDP MHz- Auction SMR
Per Population POPs Proceeds price
Capita (millions) Auctioned (U.S. $ (¢/MHz-
(U.S. $) (millions) millions) POP)
UnitedStates 27,607 266 830.7 204 24.6States




Although the spectrum bands auctioned are not directly comparable
due to variations in equipment standards,' 50 the comparison illustrates the
importance of the property rights approach. Adjusting roughly for the very
large differences in personal income, the realized price per MHz-POP in
the United States was just over twice that in Guatemala. This premium can
be understood, in part, as resulting from a number of factors: (1) the higher
fragmentation of the spectrum offered in the U.S. auction, where the
blocks auctioned were much narrower; (2) the relative scarcity of SMR
spectrum in the United States (Guatemala auctioned over six. times as
much effective spectrum);' 5' (3) the higher proportion of the U.S.
population employed in the finance, insurance, and retail (FIRE) trades; 152
150 SMR commonly operates in either the 800 MHz or the 900 MHz band. Systems in the
800 MHz band use two paired 25 kHz channels, while 900 MHz band systems use two paired 12.5 kHz
channels. Because of the different sizes of the channel bandwidths between the 800 MHz and 900
MHz systems, traditional SMR equipment is band-specific. See CARLO CARDILLI ET AL., LAW AND
ECONOMICS CONSULTING GROUP ASSESSMENT OF MARKET VALUES OF CANADIAN CELLULAR, PCS
AND ESMR LICENSES 5-6 (1997) (report on file with author). Narrower channel bandwidths also tend
to result in better spectrum utilization.
151 Guatemala auctioned 20.8 MHz, see supra note 145 and accompanying text, while the
U.S. auctioned three effective MHz, see supra note 149.
152 See CARDILLI ET AL., supra note 150, at 19 (illustrating empirically that the value of
SMR spectrum in the U.S. auctions bears a strong positive correlation to the proportion of the labor
force employed in the FIRE sectors); cf PATRICK S. MORETON & PABLO T. SPILLER, MULTI-LICENSE
BIDDING STRATEGIES IN THE FCC BROADBAND PCS SPECTRUM AUCTION (U.C. Berkeley working
paper, Jan. 1997) (on file with author) (containing analysis of the impact of FIRE employment on PCS
license valuations and finding limited evidence of a positive correlation).
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and (4) environmental factors, such as the greater monetary, political, and
regulatory stability of the United States.
The four factors above suggest that auction prices in U.S. auctions
should carry an enormous premium compared to similar auctions in
Guatemala. Thus, it is perhaps surprising that Guatemalan auction prices
were even in the same ballpark. Guatemala's higher population density
(approximately three times that of the United States" 3) must have
helped, 5 4 as well as its lack of wireline penetration. We believe, however,
that the most important factor that placed the Guatemalan auction prices at
a comparable level to U.S. auction prices was the unique property rights
that were for sale.
Winners in Guatemalan auctions knew, for instance, that they could
resell airtime on their "enhanced" SMR (ESMR) systems to any group of
users. Perhaps more importantly, they knew they could resell their
licenses, in whole or in part, to other potential operators. In fact, although
the prior utilization of these frequencies in Guatemala was exclusively for
non-interconnected SMR, at least one of the winners of the one MHz
bands declared its intention to deploy fixed wireless applications, while
others announced their intention to deploy advanced ESMR systems to
grab a slice of the large cellular market.
155
2. The FM Auctions
On August 4, 1997, Guatemala initiated a second round of auctions.
In total, thirty-three FM regional and city range radio stations were
auctioned, including some stations located in the nation's capital. A total
of thirty-seven bidders registered, with nineteen bidders winning various
radio holdings.'56 The government raised a total of $3 million from the
auction.
It is interesting to compare these numbers with those derived from
New Zealand's massive radio station auctions. New Zealand, with a per
capita income three times that of Guatemala, 5 7 obtained only slightly
more than $6 million for more than 300 AM and FM stations, or the
153 Guatemala's population density is 275 persons per square mile, see THE WORLD
ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1998, supra note 123, at 707.
154 Cf CARDILLI ET AL., supra note 150, at 19 (demonstrating that the value of SMR
spectrum in the United States was strongly related to the population density of the license area).
155 While cellular represents one in seven Guatemalan access lines, there is currently only
one operator providing only analog (AMPS) service.
156 See Website of Superintendencia de Telecommunicaciones de Guatemala (visited Dec.
10, 1998) <http://l168.234.153.31/SITGUA/indexsp.html>.
157 New Zealand's per capita income is approximately $18,300, see THE WORLD ALMANAC
AND BOOK OF FACTS 1998, supra note 123, at 803, compared to a per capita income of $3,300 in
Guatemala, see THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1998, supra note 123, at 707.
Yale Journal on Regulation
equivalent of less than $18,000 per station. 158 Guatemala, by contrast,
obtained approximately $60,000 per station. These two values are difficult
to compare, as the Guatemalan stations auctions were all FM, while those
sold in New Zealand were a mixture of AM and FM. 5 9 Additionally, the
extra value obtained in Guatemala may reflect an artificial radio scarcity
created by regulators. However, the flexibility of the Guatemalan TUFs
auctioned are in large measure responsible for the striking disparity
between the prices obtained at the Guatemalan and New Zealand auctions.
3. Assessing Guatemala's Experience: The Viability of a Property
Rights Approach
The Guatemalan experience is interesting because it is the first
experiment to implement successfully a total property rights approach to
spectrum utilization. It is difficult to judge the relative success of New
Zealand's property rights experiment to date, given early flaws in New
Zealand's auction process and the limited nature of the spectrum
auctioned. Guatemala's approach, by contrast, has already proven feasible,
even though it began only recently: The private sector has been willing to
bid large amounts, even though the system for protecting against
interference is novel and as yet untested. Furthermore, participation in the
auctions has been widespread. The'eleven participants in the SMR
auctions, and the thirty-seven participants in the radio station auctions,
show the value of spectrum fragmentation, particularly in what may be
relatively thin markets. 6 °
Guatemala's experience illustrates that property rights in spectrum, if
implemented through careful legislation and a sophisticated auction
process, are an immediately viable option for spectrum management.
Moreover, the success of the Guatemalan TUFs in unlocking spectrum
value suggests that eliminating access, usage, and transfer restrictions on
158 See Crandall, supra note 59. at 12-13. This number also includes the proceeds from the
sale of over 50 UHF TV licenses, suggesting that the actual value of the radio stations was even less
than $18,000. See id.
159 FM stations can be quite valuable, as FM subcarrier techniques can allow substantial one-
way audio or data transmission, such as paging, news, stock prices, sports scores, elevator music,
second language programming, and so on. Of the 200 kHz available in a standard FM radio slot, over
40 kHz are unused by standard FM transmission and available for data transmission, permitting a data
stream of 100 kb/s or more, depending on the subcarrier technique used. See DANIEL MINOLI,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY HANDBOOK 256-66 (1991). Of course, the Guatemalan property
rights approach would allow a right holder to use the entire 200 kHz slot for data transmission if she so
wished.
160 Indeed, the lack of spectrum fragmentation may have been the basic strategic failure of
the second-price auctions in New Zealand. The government of New Zealand chose to auction
management rights for large spectrum blocks, see Crandall, supra note 59, at 11, and "some potential
bidders may have avoided the New Zealand auction of the first three cellular bands because they
believed they could not compete with Telecom New Zealand or Bell South," see id. at 18.
80
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U.S. spectrum through similar rights could promote value-maximization of
U.S. spectrum.
IV. Toward a Property Rights System in the United States
The FCC has recognized some of the advantages generated by
spectrum property rights, and has begun edging toward a property rights
system. The FCC introduced auctions for communications spectrum in the
early 1990s, and pioneered the sequential multiple-round format in
1995,161 culminating in the extremely successful auction for the PCS A-
and B-blocks. 62 In these PCS auctions, the FCC implicitly granted what
many consider enormous usage flexibility to licensees, including allowing
licensees to choose important transmission standards. 163 In the WCS
auction, the FCC even abandoned traditional buildout requirements.'6 Due
to the tremendous revenue PCS generated, vigorous debate ensued in 1997
as to whether TV broadcasters should pay for the HDTV spectrum. 165 The
FCC recently has taken further liberalizing steps. For example, the FCC
allowed PCS licenses to be sliced and diced as holders see fit,
166
recognizing that this freedom promotes better utilization of the spectrum.
Moreover, under pressure from the likely mass default in the PCS C-block,
the FCC might allow licensees even more latitude so that they can generate
sufficient revenue to avoid default.
167
Despite these encouraging steps, however, the FCC has shied away
from any large-scale revision of the existing spectrum administration to a
property rights approach. Consequently, even for PCS licenses, where the
most substantial deregulation has occurred, the administrative process still
lurks in the background: The licenses eventually expire, and the FCC has
161 See FCC REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 49, at 8-10 (discussing the history of FCC
spectrum auctions).
162 See id. at 10 (observing that the Broadband PCS auctions raised over $7.7 billion).
163 See In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules To Establish New Personal
Communications Services, 9 F.C.C.R. 4957, 5, at 4960 (1994) (permitting "providers [to] have the
flexibility to determine the amount of spectrum needed for their particular services").
164 See In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules To Establish Part 27, the Wireless
Communications Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 10,785, 77 111-114, at 11,010 (Supp. 1997). Generally
speaking, buildout requirements prevent stockpiling by requiring that the spectrum must be used, and a
certain percentage of the market served, within a specified amount of time, generally five years.
However, for WCS licensees offering fixed, point-to-point services, the FCC indicated that as few as
"four permanent links per one million people . . . at the ten-year mark would constitute substantial
service." Id. T 113, at 10,788. In effect, with this decision, the FCC has retained buildout requirements
for WCS licenses in name only.
165 The contrasting views in this debate are summarized in CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE, WHERE DO WE Go FROM HERE? THE FCC AUCTIONS AND THE FUTURE OF RADIO SPECTRUM
MANAGEMENT 2-4 (1997).
166 See In re Geographic Partitioning and Spectrum Disaggregation by Commercial Mobile
Radio Service Licensees, II F.C.C.R. 21,831, 7 5, at 21,839 (1996).
167 See Arthur De Vany, Implementing a Market-Based Spectrum Policy, 41 J.L. & ECON.
(forthcoming 1999).
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the discretion to deny renewal. Furthermore, licensees cannot put the
spectrum to a different and more valuable use following an evolution in
technology. The system is, therefore, still quite distant from an efficient
property rights system.
To achieve an orderly transition to a property rights solution, the U.S.
must take three fundamental steps. First, the government should formally
designate spectrum as property that can be owned and registered, and for
which titles are issued.168 Second, the boundaries of the rights enjoyed by
property holders should be defined broadly) 69 Third, it should be made
explicit that any use of the spectrum is permitted, subject to the
requirements of applicable laws.
Although the FCC could, in theory, implement the transition to a
property rights system by its own initiative, it is unlikely that the FCC's
self-interest, and instinct for self-preservation, will allow it to do so.
Consequently, it is likely that the adoption of a property rights approach to
spectrum in the U.S. could only be accomplished by an Act of Congress
wiping away the decades of administrative tradition stemming from the
1927 Radio Act.
170
Although Congress could approach such legislation in a variety of
fashions, the legislation should, at a minimum, mandate the three
requirements stated above. In addition, such legislation ideally would
outline the transition to the property rights system. First, such legislation
should require the FCC to grant full property rights according to a preset
schedule, mandating that the FCC publicly auction fully transferable
warrants, each enabling an existing specific operating license to be
converted to a full property right. Although only the license holder could
combine the license with the warrant, it is likely that enough savvy
arbitrageurs would participate in such an auction to allow the government
to capture a fair portion of the value of the warrant. The government would
get something instead of nothing, which is what it receives today in most
cases, while license holders could always simply choose not to buy the
warrants. In any case, the warrants would quickly be traded and provide a
direct measure of the value locked in the essence of the spectrum property
right. 1
71
168 In this context it is important to note that the FCC "believes that FCC licenses are not
'property' subject to the bankruptcy code." FCC REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 49, at 39.
169 While this concept appears relatively straightforward, its application to spectrum, where
one must determine minimum signal to noise ratio and maximum field strength, raises difficult issues.
While this ultimately is best left to engineers, a rough analogy can be drawn with the rules that a
condominium might adopt: inhabitants may play any sort of music at any volume, provided that (1) the
volume at the boundary of each inhabitant's property does not exceed a given decibel rating, and (2)
any occupant who had moved in earlier would be entitled to a degree of peace and quiet that preserved
her rights.
170 Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
171 This is a second-best solution, as both arbitrageurs and incumbents would capture some
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. Second, such legislation optimally should strip the FCC of its
enforcement responsibilities, which would then clearly fall to the judicial
branch. The legislation also should establish a framework to guide the
judiciary, including an explicit definition of the initial standard for
injurious interference similar to that provided in the Guatemalan
legislation.'7 2 This framework would facilitate courts' ability to adjudicate
spectrum interference disputes, and absolve courts of the obligation to
create comprehensive doctrine overnight.
Conclusion
Technological change and demand forces have exposed the economic
inefficiencies and welfare losses generated by the traditional spectrum
administration, and have unleashed mounting pressures on spectrum
regulators. In response to mounting pressures from spectrum users,
regulators have begun abandoning-albeit slowly-the detailed regulation
they favor.
Although these developments push the regulatory agenda toward
property rights, they remain quite distant from what we perceive as the
ultimate reform needed to adjust the telecommunications sector to the
current and future technological onslaught: full-fledged property rights in
spectrum. Two pioneering countries have taken the lead, and we should
view these as bold experiments. While the New Zealand experiment has
been slow to bear fruit, for reasons largely outside the scope of this paper,
the Guatemalan experiment is proceeding in earnest, on track to become
the most ambitious spectrum privatization ever. The experiences in these
countries over the next five to ten years may demonstrate the substantial
welfare gains associated with such an approach, increasing the pressure on
regulators from other countries to follow on their bold path.
rents. Moreover, this method presents the possibility of a holdout problem (an inability by the warrant
holder to come to terms with the license holder). Nonetheless, even the auction of such warrants would
be Pareto-optimal in comparison to the status quo, as all parties would be better off.
172 In fact, Congress has used this approach before, notably in the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). In this legislation, Congress took the unusual step of
defining explicitly four criteria, including three quantitative criteria, to distinguish competitive from
non-competitive cable systems. See 47 U.S.C. § 543(/)(1) (1994). Only the rates of non-competitive
cable systems remain subject to regulation. See id. § 543(a)(2).

